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I
n September 2000, 147 heads of 
state met at the United Nations 
(UN) headquarters—the largest 
such gathering ever—to resolve 
action on the most pressing problems 
of humanity and nature [1]. To 
underscore their commitment, they 
set numerical targets and deadlines 
to measure performance. These are 
the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), and they span a large range 
of topics, including poverty, infectious 
disease, education, and gender equality 
(Box 1). 
This September, the heads of state 
will gather again for the Millennium +5 
Summit to assess the ﬁ  ve-year progress 
of the MDGs. They will ﬁ  nd that the 
MDGs have become all-important, 
not just within the UN, but also as the 
zeitgeist of the global development 
enterprise. As Professor Jeffrey Sachs, 
Director of the UN’s Millennium 
Project, has declared, “To the extent 
that there are any international goals, 
they are the Millennium Development 
Goals” [2]. 
But is it wise to elevate the MDGs 
to the pedestal where they now sit? 
Could it be, despite an appearance of 
ﬁ  rm targets, deadlines, and focused 
urgency, that the MDGs are actually 
imprecise and possibly ineffective 
agents for development progress? 
In this article, I argue that many of 
the most important MDGs, including 
those to reduce malaria, maternal 
mortality, or tuberculosis (TB), suffer 
from a worrying lack of scientiﬁ  cally 
valid data. While progress on each of 
these goals is portrayed in time-limited 
and measurable terms, often the 
subject matter is so immeasurable, or 
the measurements are so inadequate, 
that one cannot know the baseline 
condition before the MDGs, or know 
if the desired trend of improvement 
is actually occurring. Although UN 
scientists know about these troubles, 
the necessary corrective steps are 
being held up by political interference, 
including by the organisation’s senior 
leadership, who have ordered delays 
to amendments that could repair the 
MDGs [3]. In short, ﬁ  ve years into the 
MDG project, in too many cases, one 
cannot know if true progress towards 
these very important goals is occurring. 
Often, one has to guess.
The MDGs and Principles 
of Measurement
What makes the MDGs attractive is 
their concreteness. For example, the 
MDG to eradicate extreme poverty 
subsumes a “target” to “halve, between 
1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people whose income is less than 
$1 a day”, which in turn subsumes 
“indicators”, one of which is to measure 
income based on purchasing power.
Knowing that, worldwide, 28% 
of people in 1990 had purchasing 
power below $1 a day gives rise to a 
benchmark: that in 2015, fewer than 
14% of people should be so destitute 
[4,5]. Currently, East Asia is on 
track; sub-Saharan Africa is not [6]. 
Such deﬁ  nitive statements about the 
benchmark or the trend are possible 
because non-stop effort goes into 
measuring incomes and prices—the 
UN, governments, and businesses all do 
it—so there are sufﬁ  cient and reliable 
data.
It is harder to get sufﬁ  cient and 
reliable data for the health MDGs. Even 
the most basic life indicators, such 
as births and deaths, are not directly 
registered in the poorest countries. 
Within this decade, only one African 
country (Mauritius) registers such 
events according to UN standards 
[7]. Without reliable vital registration 
systems to track even the existence 
of births or deaths, naturally the data 
for the medical circumstances of 
those births or deaths—or the lives in 
between—are unreliable. 
Accordingly, most of the available 
data on the health MDGs come from 
methods of estimation, censuses, 
specialised household surveys, or all of 
these together. 
There are many—too many—
household surveys. In the public-
health ﬁ  eld, the best known are the 
Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS) and the Multiple Indicator 
Cluster Survey (MICS), funded mainly 
by the United States and United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
respectively [8]. In addition to those 
household surveys, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, the 
World Health Organization (WHO), 
the United Nations Population 
Fund, the World Bank, and other 
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organisations contribute surveys, 
making a rich alphabet soup—RHS, 
WHS, CWIQ, LSMS, PAPFAM, and so 
on. The proliferation is so excessive 
that there is now an International 
Household Survey Network, the 
rationale for which reads:
Donor’s [sic] support is not always 
appropriately coordinated. There are many 
examples of duplicated or conﬂ  icting data 
collection activities. This lack of coordination 
does not only causes [sic] a huge waste of 
funds, it also put [sic] a high burden on 
national statistics ofﬁ  ces. In the past few 
years, signiﬁ  cant progress has been made 
to identify synergies among different survey 
programs or to develop common questionnaire 
modules, and to conduct joint data collection 
activities. But there is certainly room for 
much more cooperation. [9]
All of this is true, but even within 
the UN, different agencies jostle 
counterproductively for data. For 
example, in 2002, the WHO launched 
a new World Health Survey in over 
70 countries to compete with the 
longer-running DHS and MICS [10]. 
Justiﬁ  ed as a “sound basis for evaluating 
progress towards the millennium 
development goals”, instead the WHO’s 
new survey tied up the few qualiﬁ  ed 
statistical staff in the poorest countries 
[11]. Three years later (at the time 
of going to press), the new project 
has yet to publish a single dataset. 
(Ironically, the WHO has since created 
a new project called the Health Metrics 
Network, for “reducing overlap and 
duplication” caused by a “plethora of 
separate and often overlapping [data] 
systems” [12]. One cannot yet say 
whether the Health Metrics Network 
will succeed at this important goal, or 
add a further layer to the problem.)
Figure 1 shows the number of 
reported DHS and MICS surveys since 
1990, which is the most common 
MDG baseline year. To generalise, 
most countries have had two or three 
such surveys, each gathering data on 
perhaps 5,000–10,000 households. 
Together with other surveys or national 
censuses, DHS and MICS are the 
backbone of measuring progress on the 
MDG health indicators. 
Yet household surveys are serviceable 
but crude tools. Even with a simple 
question, such as about a child’s birth 
weight, people’s answers only roughly 
approximate the truth, as would be 
measured by weighing on a scale [13]. 
Other survey questions are so technical 
that no layperson can answer them 
accurately. MICS, for example, asks 
parents if their child’s anti-malaria bed 
net was “ever treated with a product to 
kill mosquitoes”: an accurate answer 
depends on the type, dose, and date of 
insecticide treatment, and whether the 
local mosquito species carry insecticide 
resistance genes [14]. Because 
household surveys do not announce 
these or other sources of error, one 
can easily have false conﬁ  dence in 
them. For example, many MICS survey 
reports present their ﬁ  ndings as single-
point estimates, without any of the 
usual qualiﬁ  ers of data inaccuracy or 
quality, such as statistical conﬁ  dence 
intervals or signiﬁ  cance tests (see 
India’s report for example; [15]).
In short, there are many sources 
of data on the MDGs. When those 
sources sufﬁ  ce to reveal statistically 
signiﬁ  cant trends in the MDGs, then 
all is well, and it is possible to make 
conclusive statements: that the MDGs 
are being met, or that the MDGs are 
being missed. But, as the case studies 
below illustrate, such certainty is 
highly elusive.
Malaria
MDG 6, Target 8, pledges to “have 
halted by 2015 and begun to reverse 
the incidence of malaria”. The malaria 
MDG overlaps with a somewhat earlier 
(1998) WHO-led goal known as Roll 
Back Malaria (RBM), which aims “to 
halve malaria-associated mortality 
by 2010 and again by 2015” [16]. 
Even though the MDG and the RBM 
goal are only quasi-consistent with 
one another, the UN allows them 
to coexist, and UN communications 
often mention both [16]. Accordingly, 
both are discussed here. 
Yet with double attention on 
malaria, and the head start afforded 
by RBM, the UN still is unable to 
make an ofﬁ  cial pronouncement on 
the progress of its malaria goals. The 
WHO and UNICEF write that it is “too 
soon to determine whether the global 
burden of malaria”, meaning both 
incidence and mortality, “has increased 
or decreased since 2000” [16]. 
Too soon? RBM is in its seventh 
year, and past the halfway mark of its 
2010 deadline. The only two possible 
reasons not to know if malaria has 
increased or decreased are that the 
UN either (i) did not encourage 
timely measurements or (ii) chose 
indicators—malaria incidence 
and mortality—that are essentially 
immeasurable. 
Actually, both are true. What follows 
is a cautionary history. 
Box 1. The MDGs and Targets
By the year 2015, UN member states 
have pledged to meet eight goals; each 
goal subsumes one or more targets, as 
reproduced verbatim here (quoted from 
[40]). Details of the targets subsumed by 
goal eight and the various indicators for 
all the goals or targets can be found in 
[40,41]. 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and 
hunger
• Reduce by half the proportion of 
people living on less than a dollar a day
• Reduce by half the proportion of 
people who suffer from hunger
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary 
education
• Ensure that all boys and girls complete 
a full course of primary schooling
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and 
empower women
• Eliminate gender disparity in primary 
and secondary education preferably by 
2005, and at all levels by 2015
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality
• Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate 
among children under ﬁ  ve
Goal 5: Improve maternal health
• Reduce by three quarters the maternal 
mortality ratio
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and 
other diseases
• Halt and begin to reverse the spread 
of HIV/AIDS
• Halt and begin to reverse the incidence 
of malaria and other major diseases
Goal 7: Ensure environmental 
sustainability
• Integrate the principles of sustainable 
development into country policies 
and programmes; reverse loss of 
environmental resources
• Reduce by half the proportion of 
people without sustainable access to 
safe drinking water
• Achieve signiﬁ  cant improvement 
in lives of at least 100 million slum 
dwellers, by 2020
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership 
for development
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In 2002, the British government 
commissioned an independent 
evaluation of the UN’s malaria efforts. 
It did so because it was the largest 
ﬁ  nancier of RBM, and because of a 
perception that there was insufﬁ  cient 
alignment between the efforts of the 
UN agencies and malarious countries. 
On the subject of measuring progress, 
the evaluators wrote:
The main problem affecting…data 
collection efforts…has been that an overly 
complex and insufﬁ  ciently prescriptive 
approach has been taken. There has been a 
failure to clearly deﬁ  ne goals and priorities 
of the [measurement] strategy at the global 
and regional levels....Too many indicators 
are proposed. Too many sources of data 
are suggested. Insufﬁ  cient guidance is 
given to countries on data collection and 
methodology….Some countries are measuring 
one thing, some countries are measuring 
another….In some cases, data are being 
collected without any systematic and scientiﬁ  c 
sampling methodology, and so are essentially 
meaningless and impossible to interpret. [17]
This unsparing criticism points to 
two problems, which although they 
pertain to RBM, often apply with 
equal force to the malaria and other 
MDGs. The ﬁ  rst problem concerns 
the lack of a baseline: it is impossible 
to retrospectively measure worldwide 
(or regional, or national) malaria 
incidence and mortality existing at 
the inception of the RBM goal or the 
MDG, when the data from that era are 
universally acknowledged to be poor 
[18]. Without knowing the original 
condition, it is futile to stipulate either 
“to halve” malaria mortality by 2010 
or “to halt” malaria incidence by 2015. 
Such words have no meaning where the 
baseline is mysterious. 
The second problem concerns the 
unsuitability of the indicators: both 
malaria incidence and mortality are so 
crudely measured by household surveys 
and most countries’ health records 
that, essentially, they are immeasurable. 
The UN’s malaria monitoring group 
agrees, writing that “malaria-speciﬁ  c 
mortality should not be monitored 
routinely, as this can not be measured 
easily in malaria-endemic Africa” 
[19]. Yet the UN often ignores such 
warnings, even when they are timely, 
explicit, and the opinions of its own 
scientists. It was only two months after 
WHO scientists wrote that “it will not, 
in general, be possible to measure the 
overall incidence rate of malaria” that 
the UN chose the incidence rate as the 
mainstay of the malaria MDG [20]. 
The legacy of unfortunate decisions 
now leaves malaria risk mapping 
as the only feasible way to estimate 
(not measure) malaria incidence 
and mortality. The principle is to 
superimpose a map of a population 
onto a map of malaria intensity, 
although, in practice, the limitations 
include malaria maps from the 1960s 
and too few demographic surveillance 
sites to accurately measure and 
calibrate incidence and mortality risks 
[21,22]. The WHO has been slow to 
use risk mapping, probably because it 
fears public criticism when, inevitably, 
the current estimates of malaria severity 
must be revised upward [23,24]. 
Accordingly, years after the withering 
external evaluation, the UN neither 
has achieved convincing measurement 
or estimation of malaria incidence and 
mortality, nor has it abandoned those 
as the key indicators of progress. Both 
the RBM goal and the malaria MDG 
are today immeasurable. 
Maternal Mortality
MDG 5, Target 6, pledges to “reduce 
by three quarters, between 1990 and 
2015, the maternal mortality ratio” [1]. 
As such, this MDG target echoes a 1994 
UN goal set at the Cairo Conference on 
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Figure 1. Map of DHS and MICS Surveys 
The map shows the number of DHS and MICS surveys by country, 1990–2005, according to completed reports made available to the public in June 2005. 
These reports are top-level summaries of the underlying micro-level survey data. Note, however, that UNICEF has not publicly disclosed micro-level data 
for 13 countries (Afghanistan, Algeria, Botswana, Cambodia, Cuba, Georgia, India, the Maldives, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia), making independent veriﬁ  cation of those reports impossible (see http://www.childinfo.org; http://www.measuredhs.com/).
(Illustration: Bang Wong, www.clearscience.info)PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0958
Population and Development to halve 
maternal mortality by 2000, and again 
by 2015 [25]. 
The UN Millennium Project reports 
that at about 530,000 deaths annually, 
“overall levels of maternal mortality 
are believed to have remained 
unchanged” in the last 15 years [26]. 
Both the number of such deaths and 
the number of births are used to 
calculate the maternal mortality ratio 
(MMR; the number of women dying 
through complications of pregnancy 
and delivery per 100,000 live births). 
However, it is exactly in the poorest 
countries where the maternal mortality 
problem is severest that the data about 
deaths and births are least satisfactory. 
Vital registration would help, but few 
developing countries, accounting for 
24% of the world’s live births, have 
complete data [7]. Directly measuring 
MMR in the whole population is not 
today an option.
Therefore MMR must be estimated. 
The current method is crude, and uses 
regression modelling based on partial 
vital registration, censuses, household 
surveys, and other inputs [27]. The 
outputs are a point estimate for MMR 
in each geographic region, surrounded 
by an educated guess (not the same as 
a valid statistical conﬁ  dence interval) of 
the lower and upper range in which the 
point estimate could lie. 
Accordingly, the most recent 
(2000) published estimate for MMR 
worldwide is 400 maternal deaths per 
100,000 births, within an unscientiﬁ  c, 
best-guess range of perhaps 210 (low) 
to 620 (high) [28]. Estimates for 
the MDG baseline year (1990) are 
similarly vague [29].
Without a statistically robust estimate 
for MMR in the baseline year, or in later 
years, nobody knows whether worldwide 
MMR has increased or decreased 
since 1990, other than in a “handful 
of countries” [26]. The limitations 
of current estimation techniques 
are so profound that UNICEF and 
WHO scientists warn that “it would be 
inappropriate to compare the 2000 
estimates with those for 1990…and draw 
conclusions about trends” [28]. 
Thus, 11 years after the Cairo 
Conference ﬁ  rst set an explicit target to 
reduce MMR by 75%, the UN neither 
has achieved measurement of MMR, 
nor has it heeded the warnings of its 
own scientists that MMR is basically 
immeasurable. The MDG carries that 
mistaken goal forward to 2015, and 
the impossibility of measuring and 
demonstrating success is certainly 
preordained. 
Tuberculosis
MDG 6, Target 8, pledges to “have 
halted by 2015 and begun to reverse 
the incidence of…major diseases”, 
which the UN has interpreted to 
include TB [1]. The provenance of 
the TB MDG is it neither reiterates an 
earlier (1991) goal, nor is it obviously a 
purposeful improvement [30]. 
As with malaria, measuring TB 
incidence is notoriously difﬁ  cult. It 
requires counting the annual number 
of new patients with TB disease (i.e., 
not just new TB infections). Currently, 
no country measures TB incidence 
regularly, as the MDG target stipulates 
[31].
Fortunately, the MDG indicators 
provide for some simpler alternatives: 
TB disease prevalence and deaths 
(Indicator 23), and the proportion of 
TB disease cases detected and cured 
using a WHO-recommended treatment 
called “directly observed therapy—short 
course” (DOTS; Indicator 24). The TB 
prevalence and case detection indicators 
are directly measurable, but, ironically, 
the WHO does not actually measure 
them. Instead, it uses a unique, arguably 
outdated estimation method.
In the WHO’s method, the only 
true measurement is the number of 
new, sputum-positive TB cases that 
are detected and notiﬁ  ed to the 
authorities for treatment with DOTS. 
To estimate the case detection rate, 
the WHO divides that number of 
notiﬁ  ed TB cases (the numerator) by 
an estimate of at-large case incidence 
(the denominator) [32]. Further, 
the WHO obtains case incidence 
from “an independent estimate of 
the case detection rate” [33]. In 
effect, the WHO’s two estimates are 
circular and lack deﬁ  nite meaning, for 
each estimate draws upon the other 
estimate. Further, the WHO bases this 
estimation process on inputs that are 
not always rigorous, and the inputted 
data are often obtained from collective 
opinion rather than measurement [33].
Accordingly, it is impossible to state 
the actual trends in TB disease with any 
degree of statistical conﬁ  dence. The 
WHO’s best guess is that its estimates 
“typically range from −20% to [+]40%” 
in accuracy [32].
Others have criticised the circular 
estimation technique. The WHO’s 
former director for evidence argues 
that “essentially no empirical basis 
exists to assess the trend in case 
detection in regions where tuberculosis 
is most prevalent, including sub-
Saharan Africa” [34]. He calls the 
WHO’s trend estimates “serial 
guessing” [34]. Certainly, the WHO’s 
leading assumption (known as the 
“Styblo rule” [35]) has infrequently 
been tested in Africa, where TB is 
accelerated by an unparalleled HIV/
AIDS epidemic. The WHO’s own 
scientists concede that it may no longer 
apply there [32]. 
Nevertheless, the WHO maintains 
that where access to DOTS treatment 
is extensive—that is, not in Africa—its 
estimated case detection rates are an 
adequate guide to true TB trends. This 
is debatable: in China, which is the 
WHO’s ﬁ  nest DOTS success, actual 
measurements (not estimations) of TB 
prevalence corroborated the WHO’s 
case detections less well than expected 
[36].
The best solution now proposed 
in the scientiﬁ  c literature would 
redeﬁ  ne the case detection rate, based 
on measuring true TB prevalence 
by widespread radiographic or 
microscopic surveys [31]. Although 
similar prevalence measurements have 
been the cornerstone of East Asia’s 
successful attack on TB, the WHO 
resists changing from estimation to true 
measurement [37]. As a result, nobody 
can say with scientiﬁ  c conﬁ  dence what 
the actual trends for TB are or whether 
the TB MDG is on track. 
Child Mortality
The above case studies could leave the 
dismal impression that all time-limited 
development goals are immeasurable, 
lack baseline data, and imply trends 
having no scientiﬁ  c meaning. Not 
quite. There is a happy exception: 
MDG 4, Target 5, which reads to 
“reduce by two thirds, between 1990 
and 2015, the under-ﬁ  ve [child] 
mortality rate” [1]. 
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The under-ﬁ  ve child mortality 
(U5M) rate is an excellent MDG 
indicator because it is easily measured. 
For most parents the birth or death of a 
child is highly memorable; ask properly 
about these events in a household 
survey and their recollection is likely to 
be accurate. If the survey asks enough 
parents in a population, and continues 
to ask at regular intervals, a statistically 
signiﬁ  cant trend emerges with time—
the very point of the MDGs.
The best proof of this concept 
comes from Africa. Using data from 
sequential DHS cycles, in Ghana during 
1988–1998, the U5M rate improved 
30% [38]. Conversely, in Zimbabwe 
during 1988–1999, the U5M rate 
deteriorated 44% [38]. Unlike other 
MDGs where such changes are, to put 
it bluntly, only guessed at, these trends 
in the U5M rate are properly measured 
and, importantly, are scientiﬁ  cally 
meaningful, with conﬁ  dence intervals 
that reveal the accuracy and quality of 
the underlying data. Just by keeping 
the current DHS technique, and 
interviewing about 7,000 women per 
country every ﬁ  ve years, it is possible 
to reliably detect either a 15% gain 
or loss in the U5M rate with scientiﬁ  c 
conﬁ  dence.
There is an invaluable and gratifying 
lesson to draw from the U5M case study: 
if the UN sets an MDG target that is 
practical to measure (most are not), 
and the measurement technique for 
that MDG target is suitable (most are 
not), and measurements are taken at 
the baseline year and in subsequent 
years (they rarely are), it is then possible 
to measure the state of the world’s 
health reliably and accurately, and with 
excellent scientiﬁ  c conﬁ  dence regarding 
the trend. In short, it becomes possible 
to know, not just to guess, if the MDGs 
are on track or not—even in Africa. 
Discussion
I did not write this paper to doubt 
the moral necessity of investing more 
money and political capital in global 
development; that is unarguable, and 
it would be reprehensible to use these 
arguments to seed those doubts. 
Instead, I hope to open an important 
debate, unable to be fully answered 
by this paper, on a hitherto almost 
unexplored question: is the world 
better off with or without the MDGs 
and similar UN-sponsored, time-
limited, quantitative development 
goals? The answer to that question 
must be sought without pro-UN or anti-
UN ideology, but with awareness that 
there are two prongs to consider: (i) 
whether such goals are interpreted so 
as to advance the dignity and well-being 
of the large number of people who live 
in extreme poverty , and (ii) whether 
such goals advance the reputation of 
the UN and the global development 
establishment. I believe the MDGs risk 
trouble on both fronts.
Viewed objectively, it must be agreed 
that the MDGs palter. The health goals 
for 2015 sound quantitative, but for 
most of them, their quantiﬁ  cation is 
irretrievably ﬂ  awed. The trends that 
the health goals allude to are either 
immeasurable or were not measured 
properly from the 1990 baseline year 
onward. This is not an extraordinarily 
controversial conclusion: recall that 
in each of the cautionary examples 
discussed—malaria, maternal mortality, 
and TB—the UN’s own current or 
former staff have said that the trends 
are immeasurable or lack baseline data. 
Short of abandoning the MDGs, 
the better option is to amend the 
goals, targets, or indicators—all three 
levels of the hierarchy—to be feasibly 
measurable. 
Unfortunately, the UN leadership 
has, to date, delayed this option. In a 
September 2004 memo, one year ahead 
of the Millennium +5 Summit, the UN’s 
Deputy Secretary General instructed 
the organisation’s experts in charge of 
the MDG statistics with the following: 
The [Millennium +5 Summit]…should 
not be distracted by arguments over the 
measurement of the MDGs—or worse, 
over different numbers being used by 
different agencies for the same indicator…. 
[P]roposals for modiﬁ  cations of deﬁ  nitions 
or new indicators will only be considered 
formally after the [Millennium +5 
Summit]… as any changes at this stage 
would only distract from the result that we 
would like to achieve. [3]
The Deputy Secretary General’s 
order interferes with and shows a 
profound disrespect for the scientiﬁ  c 
process—a process that fundamentally 
is not “distracted by arguments” nor 
disturbed by “different numbers”. On 
the contrary, intellectual arguments 
between scientists are essential for 
devising new methods of measurements 
for the MDGs, so that they in turn yield 
more accurate numbers about the 
extent and causes of extreme poverty. 
By suppressing proposals to amend 
the MDGs ahead of the Millennium 
+5 Summit, the UN leadership 
discarded the only timely opportunity 
to win high-level political support 
for truly measurable, scientiﬁ  cally 
meaningful goals. While the Deputy 
Secretary General plans “a process 
that will consider recommendations 
regarding reﬁ  nements” to the MDGs, 
Box 2. Five Recommendations 
to Make the MDGs Truly Time-
Limited and Quantitative
• Convene an external (non-UN) scientiﬁ  c 
peer review to examine the goals, targets, 
and indicators to ascertain whether the 
desired trend of improvement in each 
is, with current data, measurable or 
estimable at scientiﬁ  cally accepted levels 
of accuracy and statistical signiﬁ  cance.
• For those goals, targets, or indicators 
measurable by household surveys, 
choose only a single survey instrument; 
determine the minimum sample size 
needed to detect favourable or adverse 
trends with statistical signiﬁ  cance; 
conduct the survey at regular intervals; 
and make all the micro-level data fully 
public, so independent scientists can 
replicate the UN’s conclusions. Eliminate 
the many superﬂ  uous household surveys 
now in use.
• For those goals, targets, or indicators 
not measurable by household surveys, 
institute sample surveys (“mini censuses”) 
by creating a large number of new 
demographic surveillance sites in various 
countries. The Canadian-funded Tanzania 
Essential Health Interventions Project is 
a superb example (see [18]; http://video.
idrc.ca/tehip/tehip_dss_e_1000.asx; 
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.
cfm?story_id=1280587). 
• For those goals, targets, or indicators 
that are not measurable by any practical 
means, ﬁ  rst consider to amend them, 
and if that is not possible, abandon 
them (bearing in mind that any feasible 
amendment to the goals, targets, or 
indicators can only modestly deviate 
from the political consensus that 
underpins the MDGs now). 
• Within 18 months, hold a high-level UN-
sponsored event at which governments 
ratify ﬁ  nal actions for all the above. Have 
those actions be developed by external 
scientists and given to the Deputy 
Secretary General directly.
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the process will commence only 
after this September’s summit [3]. 
As a result, any recommendations 
to amend the MDGs that may arise 
must await ratiﬁ  cation at the next 
heads-of-state summit—presumably, 
the Millennium +10 Summit in 2010 
(to date, summits occur every ﬁ  ve 
years). In that case, there would 
remain only ﬁ  ve years to the MDGs’ 
ﬁ  nal reckoning in 2015. Such extreme 
delay is illogical and sabotages the 
MDGs’ chances of success. 
Some may disagree with my emphasis 
on measurement and timelines. One 
anonymous peer reviewer of this paper 
wrote that while measuring the MDGs 
is “of concern for epidemiologists and 
others”, my interpretation “misses the 
point” because the purpose of the 
MDGs is merely to be exhortatory. “The 
MDGs are not a measuring exercise”, 
wrote the reviewer, but instead are a 
“common vision of what matters most 
for improving the lives of people in 
poor countries”. 
This sort of thinking, although 
widespread among development 
professionals, is neglectful towards 
people living in extreme poverty. 
Neglect occurs when one touts the 
MDGs for the “common vision” of, say, 
reducing maternal mortality, while 
being indolent about measurements to 
prove mortality is genuinely decreasing. 
That formulation values consensus 
about helping pregnant women, ahead 
of certainty about helping pregnant 
women—an outcome that, if they knew 
about it, the women could easily ﬁ  nd 
ideological and dehumanising.
Further, the notion that the MDGs 
are merely exhortatory discriminates 
against the world’s poorest people. 
Imagine if European or American 
leaders, taking aim at poverty in 
their own countries, set quantitative 
goals to reduce unemployment or 
teen pregnancy—only to declare the 
unemployment and teen pregnancy 
rates were “not a measuring exercise”. 
Most people would abhor the 
dishonesty, for obvious reasons. 
But if it is shameful, as I believe, 
to interpret the MDGs as merely 
exhortatory, imparting no standards of 
performance, the converse error also 
exists: to interpret the MDGs as all-
encompassing and imparting too many 
standards of performance. 
The latest fashion, exempliﬁ  ed 
by the UN Millennium Project, is 
to treat the MDGs as catch-alls or 
tautologies for development itself. 
In a list entitled “Interventions by 
MDG Target”, the UN Millennium 
Project recommends to build “roads” 
or “transport infrastructure” for all of 
the following MDG targets: primary 
education, hunger, gender equality, 
water and sanitation, child mortality, 
and, of course, malaria, maternal 
mortality, and TB [39]. Electricity, slum 
upgrading, and education are similar 
panaceas. 
Deﬁ  nitely roads or electricity matter 
to holistic development, but justifying 
those under the cover of goals expressly 
for child mortality or malaria, makes 
goal-setting seem pointless. Worse, 
such justiﬁ  cation sounds dishonest—a 
camouﬂ  age job. It is no wonder that 
with the MDGs subordinated into 
empty vessels for tenuously related 
interventions—subordinated into, as 
Professor Jeffrey Sachs says, just “any 
international goals”—there is resistance 
to measure the progress of the speciﬁ  c 
goals, targets, and indicators with rigor 
and precision [2]. 
I believe that without thoroughgoing 
action to change the current scenario 
(see Box 2), the MDGs could turn 
from opportunity to liability. As 2015 
nears, the UN becomes increasingly 
vulnerable to criticism if it still lacks 
data to prove whether the MDGs are 
or are not being met. A stream of 
embarrassing disclosures, similar to the 
external evaluation of RBM, will likely 
ensue. Certainly journalists will report 
the embarrassments, and opponents of 
foreign aid may use them to discredit 
further generosity to poor countries. 
These unhappy events are entirely 
foreseeable, and for that reason, must 
give pause to anyone who naively 
believes that measuring the MDGs is 
an occupation only scientists need care 
about. Anyone wishing to preserve the 
credibility of the UN and the global 
development enterprise ten years from 
now also must care. 
More thoughtful and timely action 
for the sake of these institutions, and, 
needless to say, the millions of people 
who shall live—or die—with the success 
or failure of the MDGs, is only wise.   
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